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officers as Vice Admiral Struble; it was
actually Rear Admiral Doyle. Struble was
aboard his own flagship, the cruiser Roches-
ter. According to protocol, MacArthur
should have been aboard Struble’s ship;
however, he elected to go with Doyle in-
stead. The irony is that Doyle and Struble
enjoyed a strong mutual antipathy.
It would have been useful to be able to refer
to Weintraub’s sources to trace the origins
of his errors, but unfortunately, he conde-
scends that “endnote numbers are eschewed
as intrusive, as are most footnotes.” He be-
lieves that “extensive back matter notes”
on each chapter’s sources would suffice.
(It is worth mentioning that the Marine
Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 1-0,
Leading Marines—primarily intended for
young enlisted Marines—shows there as
FMFM 101.) It is impossible to ascertain
from his back-matter notes where specific
material originated, unless one compares
the text line by line with each source men-
tioned. I tried to do that for the dialog the
author offers for the famous 23 August 1950
“showdown” meeting regarding the Inchon
landing. Parts comport with published ac-
counts and participants’ recollections, but
some of it I have never seen before. Per-
haps it came from sources unnamed, but
without notes one cannot be certain.
Notes are not a luxury or, to use Weintraub’s
word, an “intrusion.” The author must
know that. Notes are at the heart of rigor-
ous scholarly research. Research is a so-
cial process, and its linchpin is the ability of
other scholars to check the validity of re-
ported findings. Ultimately, MacArthur’s
War contributes little to our understand-
ing of the Korean War. It is so fraught with
errors that it cannot be taken seriously.
It is a regrettable book.
DONALD CHISHOLM
Naval War College
Cable, James. The Political Influence of Naval Force
in History. New York: St. Martin’s, 1998. 213pp.
$59.95
Sir James Cable is a noted writer on naval
affairs. His Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919–1991
is a well regarded classic on the role of
naval force.
His latest work is a historical survey of
the political purposes for which gov-
ernments have made use of naval force.
Cable defines “naval force” as that “ex-
ercised by fighting ships manned by
disciplined sailors at the direction of a
central command responsible to the
political leadership.” His definition is
necessary to distinguish naval force as
we understand it today from the force
exercised by pirates, privateers, adven-
turers, and users of “landing craft”
(such as those that brought Roman sol-
diers to Britain in 55 A.D.) or galleys,
which served merely as conveyances to
bring soldiers together for seaborne
hand-to-hand combat.
Cable examines the extent to which naval
force furthered the political purposes of
the governments that used it—the scale
and nature of the force employed are not
otherwise considered relevant. He focuses
on examples of the use of force “for po-
litical purposes in which the naval element
is significant, the facts are reasonably well
established, and the degree of success or
failure and the durability of the result
are clear enough for useful conclusions
to be drawn.”
This definition thus largely excludes
consideration of fighting at sea before the
1500s, because standing navies were rare,
thus precluding the presence of disci-
plined officers and sailors. Portugal in
the sixteenth and the Netherlands in the
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seventeenth century first used naval
force for political purposes, with great
success in founding large empires. The
establishment of global empires and
expanded seaborne trade fostered the
emergence of significant national navies
(as opposed to privateers and pirates).
Cable surveys various instances when the
use of naval force had profound,
long-lasting political effects. Obviously,
victories in major sea battles like Trafalgar
or Tsushima, the ultimate use of naval
force, could have significant political fall-
out. Yet the uses of naval force did not
have to be that dramatic to have such
effect. Cumulative efforts—such as those
of the British to attain command of the
seas in the eighteenth century; of the
British (and others) to stamp out the
slave trade in the nineteenth century; of
the Union navy to blockade the Confed-
eracy during the Civil War; of the Ger-
man submarine campaigns to interdict
sea traffic to Great Britain; and of the
Japanese campaign to conquer Southeast
Asia—all had long-lasting political con-
sequences, even if the eventual outcomes
were not always intended.
Discrete exercises of noncombat naval
forces have also had huge political conse-
quences. For instance, the Dutch navy’s
successful landing of William of Orange
in England enabled the Glorious Revolu-
tion and all that followed from it in Brit-
ain (and Ireland). French naval
intervention off Yorktown in 1781 was
critical in ending the American Revolu-
tion. (“Indeed, we can scarcely expect to
encounter any result of the use of naval
force for political purposes that is larger
or more lasting than the independence of
the United States.”) The U.S. Navy’s
“opening of Japan” had profound effects
on that nation’s development and thus
Japan’s impact on subsequent world
history. More recently, the Royal Navy’s
attack on the French navy in July 1940
was intended in part to influence Ameri-
can political opinion concerning British
resolve to resist Nazi Germany.
Political influence from naval force can
be latent as well. German construction
of its High Seas Fleet, as well as British
contemplation of “Copenhagening”
that fleet in the decade before World
War I, negatively affected the political
environment of that era. The rise of the
Soviet Navy in the 1970s and 1980s sig-
nificantly affected U.S. political debate
about national security; arguably, “the
growth [in the 1980s] of the U.S. Navy
probably caused greater harm to the So-
viet Union than all the confrontations at
sea put together.”
Cable does not really address “dogs that
did not bark”—that is, the absence of
naval force, or more properly, the fail-
ure to use it. A counterfactual argument
is usually difficult to make convincingly.
However, the Royal Navy’s failure to
stop Italy from using the Suez Canal in
1935 during the Ethiopian campaign,
and the impact of that failure on the Eu-
ropean political scene, would appear to
be a good case in point. It has been
thought that the absence of strong Royal
Navy forces in Singapore in 1941 played
into Japanese political calculations. This
would seem a good area for inquiry as
the United States enters the Quadren-
nial Defense Review season. The Navy,
like the other services, generally makes
affirmative arguments for what it pro-
vides the nation; the possible conse-
quences of not having the capability to
be engaged is less often argued, yet may
be even more compelling.
Cable ends with some “lessons and spec-
ulations.” These are, unfortunately, not
sharply focused. As he admits, it is hard
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to discern any real patterns from his his-
torical survey, and even if any exist, the
stockbroker’s warning that “future results
cannot be predicted from past performance”
applies. At best, “if anything approaching
a principle emerges from the confused
record of the past it may be that the nat-
ural political environment for navies,
their raison d’être, is the unforeseen. . . .
Warships allow choice, naval force is a
flexible instrument.”
The book is a good short summary of the
political uses of naval force, both in-
tended and unintended, over the past
fifty years. However, it is of limited value
in helping today’s defense analysts and
policy makers think through the require-
ments for tomorrow’s naval forces.
JAN VAN TOL
Commander, U.S. Navy
CNO Executive Panel Staff
Lambert, Nicholas. Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revo-
lution. Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina Press,
1999. 364pp. $39.95
This is a very good book and a very im-
portant one. Nicholas Lambert has fol-
lowed in the path of Jon Sumida’s In
Defense of Naval Supremacy to present a
lucid, compelling, and comprehensive
analysis of the policies of Admiral Sir
John Fisher and the Royal Navy in the
decade before 1914. This work is based
upon Lambert’s doctoral study of the de-
velopment of the submarine, but it goes
much farther than his original work in
explaining the fundamental elements of
Fisher’s naval policies and their effects on
the Royal Navy.
Lambert’s command of the primary
sources is remarkable. He supplements
grand strategy, national financial policy,
and politics with the details of
operational and tactical concepts with a
skill that illuminates the linkages between
the various levels and gives them all suffi-
cient and appropriate weight. His treat-
ment not only lays bare the superficial
nature of much previous historical re-
search in this era but also indicates the
degree to which that superficiality has
caused our understanding of the period
to be profoundly flawed.
The book is not an easy read, but Lam-
bert’s solid prose and grasp of his narra-
tive allow the reader to follow his way
through the labyrinth that was British
naval policy in the Fisher era. To detail
all its facets would take up an entire issue
of the Naval War College Review, but
some explanation is worthwhile.
Lambert makes clear that Fisher was in-
stalled as First Sea Lord in 1904 primarily
to cut spending at a time when the Brit-
ish government desperately needed to
achieve economies in its budget. He shows
that Fisher developed extraordinary
schemes to utilize emergent technology
to maintain Britain’s naval dominance
when that dominance was being increas-
ingly challenged and the country’s ability
to pay becoming ever more dubious. He
shows too that Fisher’s ideas of dominance
always focused on Britain’s worldwide re-
quirements, particularly in the protection
of sea communications (the threat from
Germany was not the primary motivation
of British naval policy until much later).
Lambert shows the devious way in which
Fisher operated, often concealing his true
motivations from politicians and naval
colleagues alike, but he also maps out the
logic behind the admiral’s approach. To
Sumida’s explanation of the origins of
the battle cruiser as the worldwide in-
strument of commerce protection, Lam-
bert adds the concept of the “flotilla,” by
which small craft—both surface and
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